Russian Media in Exile Finds Purpose and Global Relevance

Putin’s ability to sustain his disastrous war in Ukraine depends nearly as much on his shutting down Russian civil society and independent media as his maintaining the supply of soldiers and weapons. In the days after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, most of those working in Russian independent media were forced to flee abroad one step ahead of the FSB. Many outlets had to shut down and start anew with new titles and in new formats. Founders, editors, and journalists all struggled to obtain legal status and to establish financial viability, for themselves and their media projects, in their new home countries. For a time, it seemed that Russian independent media, which emerged as a beacon in the twilight years of the USSR and, some argue, had become a true fourth estate for Russian society, was on the verge of extinction. 

Three years later, however, Russian independent media in exile are not just surviving: they are producing groundbreaking reporting, investigations, and analyses. They are demonstrating extraordinary creativity in circumventing Russia’s multibillion-dollar censorship apparatus. Their reporters are facing numerous challenges and threats, including physical ones, as they grapple with how to stay relevant for their target audiences inside Russia at a time when independent on-the-ground reporting there is a serious crime. They must also contend with the Russian state’s success at manipulating Big Tech’s search and social media algorithms to promote pro-Kremlin content while suppressing content from independent outlets.

All of this makes the breadth and depth of the independent reporting produced by these outlets—as well as their audience reach—especially impressive. Last year, JX Fund, a European NGO that tracks supports exiled media outlets from countries where independent press no longer exists, estimated that there were some 66 Russian independent news media operating abroad. In July 2024, their websites logged nearly 32 million visits in total. Between August of 2023 and 2024, they reached 3.25 billion cumulative YouTube views. 

To appreciate the diversity and scope of reporting provided by these outlets, one only needs to follow the site of Redkollegia (“Editorial Board”)— a project that awards monetary prizes to several independent Russian journalists each month. Financed by the Russian businessman Boris Zimin, the prize has become the most prestigious and coveted professional award in Russian independent journalism. Redkollegia’s site also serves as an aggregator of content its selection committee considers worthy of the prize, highlighting on a rolling basis the best of Russian independent reporting. Among January candidates, for instance, is a piece about a Ukrainian POW who was tortured and sentenced to 20 years in a Russian prison; articles reporting on the unfolding environmental disaster that resulted from the collision of two oil tankers in the Black Sea; and an interview with a former senior German intelligence official shining a spotlight on his country’s blind spots concerning Russia. 

Impact Beyond Russian-Speaking World

Longer form articles include a joint investigation by the renowned independent Russian investigative outlet The Insider and Der Spiegel that reports on how Russian intelligence services paid the Taliban to carry out terrorist attacks against American military targets in Afghanistan. The article fills out crucial details that were missing from the 2020 New York Times piece, “Russia Secretly Offered Afghan Militants Bounties to Kill U.S. Troops, Intelligence Says”—from detailing how Russian intelligence transferred money to its recruiting targets the terrorists (via a fake diamond-trading business), to disclosing the identities of officers involved in the operation—members of the same unit that conducted high-profile acts of assassination and sabotage in Europe, including the Skripal poisoning. 

Reporting on the Kremlin influence and intelligence operations, according to JX Fund, has become “the most impactful area of Russian exiled media reporting,” enabling the “identification and arrest of Russian agents on EU territory.” The relevance for American audiences is obvious as well, including for policymakers tasked with shaping US policy toward Russia. 

Last year saw the publication of at least two investigations concerning the US. One, published in October by iStories under the title “Western companies supply billions of dollars’ worth of goods to Russia but have no clue about it,” described the mechanisms behind a poorly understood sanctions-evasion scheme known as “fake transit.” Under the scheme, companies transport sanctioned or dual-use goods from the EU to Russia directly across the EU border. These goods cross the Russian border in Latvia, Poland, Belarus, or Finland on their way to Kazakh, Chinese or Azeri companies. Once the goods arrive, these companies immediately re-register the cargo “for import into Russia.”  This form of sanctions evasion, reporters note, is far cheaper and harder to track than delivering the goods to a third Russia-friendly country such as Turkey and reimporting them from there. This report is of particular importance as the US government reassess its sanctions policy vis-à-vis Russia. 

Another story of note came out in March of last year in the independent Russian financial and business publication The Bell. Titled “New Russians. A Ranking of Buyers of Assets Left Behind by Foreign Companies,” it surveys the value and current disposition of assets that foreign companies were forced to sell at bargain-basement prices while exiting Russia under pressure in 2022. Those benefiting from the fire-sale include some well-known figures, ranging from “Putin’s oligarchs” like Igor Sechin, Arkady Rotenberg and Alexei Miller, to the original oligarchs that made their fortunes in the first Yeltsin-era privatizations like Vagit Alekperov and Vladimir Potanin. 

The real surprise from the report, however, was the significant number of mid-tier businessmen, who used the crisis to jump into a “higher league.” “It was the businessmen of the middle tier who’ve become true ‘new Russians,’” writes reporter Irina Pankratova. The piece identifies 40 businessmen who benefited from the plunder, highlighting the examples of the top 20 individuals that acquired high-value assets from Mercedes, Volkswagen, McDonalds, Starbucks, Danon, Shell, Volvo, Mitsubishi, Societe Generale and other global brands. By the time the war in Ukraine concludes, writes Pankratova, Russian business landscape, including its key players, will have transformed beyond recognition. 

Foundation of Western Reporting on Russia

The value and potential impact of these two investigations are clear. They also demonstrate top-notch technical skills Russian journalists have developed over the years, observes Sergey Parkhomenko, who oversees the Redkollegia prize. Having adapted to working in conditions of extreme censorship and limited access to information, Russian journalists have learned to develop creative ways to access information, including by gathering and cross-checking massive amounts of data. These skills have positioned them at the top of the profession, making the reporters desirable assets in conducting international investigative projects such as the Panama Papers. Their work also serves as “the foundation of Western reporting on Russia,” notes JX Fund. “Without them, many international media would struggle to keep up with what is happening” within an increasingly isolated Russia. 

This kind of reporting serves the interests of two audiences at once, Parkhomenko says. On the one hand, their audiences inside Russia get a glimpse of how Russian authorities enrich themselves on both war and international sanctions. Western audiences, on the other hand, get access to the data and analyses that helps them understand events in Russia, and the impact of their governments’ policies toward the country. 

These two investigative pieces in particular suggest that not only have the sanctions failed to limit Putin’s ability to finance his war in Ukraine; they have produced new, illicit streams of income for insiders connected to the regime. With Russian businesses that benefit from Putin’s patronage getting richer, the Kremlin can extract an additional informal, yet sizeable, tax to support its war machine, Parkhomenko asserts. “This is a really important message for Western audiences that can influence Western politicians and decisionmakers. These policymakers must consider the effectiveness of the sanctions that they have imposed on Russia so far, and how to reform those sanctions to better achieve their goals,” he concludes. 

Importantly, independent Russian journalism today is the only remaining public square available to the Russian public, notes Maxim Trudolyubov, the editor-in-chief of this blog. For audiences in Russia, politics is non-existent and civil society projects are now impossible. Free speech, on the other hand, whether written or spoken, has the ability to penetrate the Kremlin’s propagandistic bubble. The individuals working in Russian media in exile represent something more than an informational resource. They share a commitment to the institution and values a free media represent, making them a crucial ally of the West in its confrontation with Putin’s regime. 

The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.