The 2026 FIFA World Cup serves as a model of sports diplomacy, offering a valuable blueprint for how North American nations can foster cross-border cooperation in international trade despite current frictions.
As the rollercoaster of emotions ignited by the 2026 World Cup (WC) comes to an end, we must reflect on the importance of this sporting event as a blueprint for North American cooperation.
As the largest WC to date, with 48 teams and 104 matches across 16 cities, and co-hosted by three North American countries, this event has historical significance in people-to-people sports diplomacy. The Mexico-England game broke records, becoming the most-watched non-US men's national team WC match in US history, with roughly 45 million combined US viewers across Fox Sports, the Spanish-language Telemundo, and Peacock. Reflecting on this WC is especially relevant given that the co-host countries are currently navigating important complexities in their trade relationship, with the US declining on July 1 to renew the USMCA in its current form and the US and Mexico holding a third round of USMCA bilateral negotiations this week in Mexico City.
Some of the greatest barriers to global cooperation and collective action stem from the absence of effective incentive structures and enforcement mechanisms. The exercise in sports diplomacy and trilateral cooperation exemplified by the 2026 FIFA WC offers insight into potential avenues for escaping collective action problems and mechanisms that the international system can model to promote global cooperation.
Within the international system, states maintain sovereignty, prioritize survival, and act as self-interested actors in an environment lacking a central authority to which all nations are accountable. Such qualities make the sphere of international affairs precarious and create an environment fraught with collective action problems, thereby highlighting the difficulties of negotiating agreements such as the USMCA or addressing global challenges. Indeed, although nations may face a problem collectively shared with others, there are incentives to cheat on agreements or forgo consensus altogether when a state's calculus determines that its contribution will be insignificant or the utility it receives is small. The collective consequently reaches an equilibrium short of an ideal outcome otherwise possible if all cooperate. When little basis exists for shared values upon which to work together, the difficulties for cooperation are further exacerbated. Consider the current frictions raised by Ambassador Greer in the context of the USMCA, such as the rules of origin and third-country content, and the US's decision to decline to renew the agreement in its current form at the first joint review.
However, mechanisms exist to bridge the divide, especially when paths open for pooling resources and proper alignment of incentives. Sports diplomacy is one realm in which to witness these elements at work. As understood by scholars such as S. Murray, sports diplomacy amounts to the execution of diplomatic and representative actions undertaken by those in the world of sports on behalf of, and with, their home nation. Sports diplomacy, as displayed in the FIFA WC, offers a potential model for pooling resources, aligning incentives, and capitalizing on values-based cooperation between nations when gaps may otherwise be so wide as to preclude consistent cooperation. An iteration of soft power and diplomatic activity, sports diplomacy provides opportunities for nations to interact via state and non-state means of cooperation, which is especially relevant in the context of international trade.
The 2002 WC, co-hosted by Japan and South Korea, provides precedent for the tangible success of FIFA-style cooperation and sports diplomacy capable of facilitating not only cooperation but reconciliation. Before the nations' joint hosting of the WC, Japan and the Republic of Korea found themselves in a state of cold relations since World War II. The FIFA World Cup, however, helped initiate and solidify a trend of reconciliation as the two nations had to actively coordinate and cooperate to achieve the first two-nation hosting of the World Cup. Breakthroughs in reconciliation continued through attendant cultural exchanges and the mobilization of each nation's youth through sports exchange programs.
A joint statement produced by Japan and the Republic of Korea reflects the cooling of tensions and warming of relations with the claim that "[t]he 2002 FIFA World Cup…has moved the hearts of the world and has truly brought the world together by transcending the differences in race, culture, ideology and religion." Although aspirational, the statement remains indicative of the soft hope and power of sports diplomacy, and of the structures for cooperation provided by models such as those of NGOs like FIFA.
The 2026 WC saw successful outcomes, as measured by large turnouts and viewership, and by visible cross-cultural exchange through official jersey designs and even unexpected camaraderie between Scots and Bostonians.
As an NGO with broad international participation and an established structure, FIFA addresses the challenges present in the international sphere. The WC provides an opportunity for cooperation toward a common goal, bringing together a large membership and creating a framework for pooling resources and aligning incentives. FIFA has 211 member associations on record, which is larger than the UN’s 193 member states and the WTO’s 166 members. FIFA membership includes territories that are not sovereign states, unlike the UN and WTO, allowing soccer to build a wider network than membership limited to sovereign states would allow.
For the WC to take place, there is a need to pool resources among the member associations, where everyone involved needs to invest resources. Participating associations must invest in their teams, and host countries must invest in the infrastructure required to stage the sporting event. Latest estimates suggest that Canada allocated $473 million in federal support to host 13 games in two cities, and the US allocated $625 million through a FEMA grant program for security and preparedness to host 78 matches in 11 cities. Mexico hosted 13 matches across 3 cities, and the Mexican federal government also made a significant economic commitment by offering a broad tax exemption to FIFA and its organizing partners. While most evidence on the net impact of hosting the WC reports negative effects for host cities, the 2026 WC's reliance on existing infrastructure across three host countries has reduced the need for one of the largest and riskiest investments. All 2026 WC venues were existing facilities, which is different from the large-scale stadium construction we saw when Brazil and Qatar hosted the WC.
Regarding incentive alignment for cooperation, the WC offers a mechanism in which member associations are committed to following the rules and resources are clearly allocated. FIFA committed $655 million to be distributed among the 48 participating teams, with varying funding allocations for different prizes: $50 million for first place, $9 million for the bottom 16 (33rd to 48 finishers), and $1.5 million to all teams to cover preparation. The WC is an indefinitely repeated game that takes place every four years and motivates all involved actors to create and maintain a reputation for cooperation. This aligns with Axelrod’s theory of the evolution of cooperation, in which relationships among actors are based on reciprocity and actors are motivated primarily by self-interest rather than goodwill. With an extended shadow of the future, the establishment of incentives capitalizes on the reality of reciprocity.
The model exhibited by the 2026 FIFA WC holds promise in its application to problem-solving in the context of international trade. The WC provides an example of a "club good," as Buchanan identified in 1965, and has created an infrastructure for global cooperation that can be applied to trade agreements. Under a “club good” framework, enforcement works by excluding those who do not cooperate. In the case of a free trade area agreement like the USMCA, exclusion applies to those outside the agreement. There is a possibility of North American cooperation through collective action on an excludable, non-rivalrous good (a club good), which can be adapted from the WC framework of cooperation.
To understand the mechanisms at play for international trade and what we can learn from sports diplomacy in the context of the WC, we refer here to Ostrom’s ideas on governing the commons. She notes that professional athletic leagues face the problem of the commons, where there is a temptation to cheat, but they use private monitors to enforce the rules. Her design principles, developed for common-pool resources but applicable to collective action problems generally, hold that sustained cooperation requires clearly defined boundaries that delineate how resources will be withdrawn, and collective-choice arrangements that allow those affected by the rules to modify them when needed. She also notes that monitoring, sanctions, and conflict-resolution mechanisms can be implemented to ensure desirable behavior among those involved.
The USMCA has specific rules that member countries must follow, specified in 34 chapters. The joint review process initiated in July 2026, as specified in the agreement, provides a mechanism for member countries to review and potentially revise the provisions of the trade agreement. Under the USMCA, Chapter 31 specifies the dispute settlement mechanisms to deal with disagreements in trade practices.
The WC experience sheds light on how cooperation can develop within North American international trade. The demonstrated exercise in sports diplomacy provides space for state and non-state actors to interact toward a common goal, bringing people together through means applicable in different circumstances.
Without a central body of enforcement and the persistent plurality of cultures and values, the international system remains anarchic, and widespread cooperation amongst nations often stays elusive. Yet, the conduct of the 2026 FIFA WC presents hope and a model of cooperation applicable to global challenges. The practice of sports diplomacy displayed throughout this year's WC demonstrated the feasibility of pooling resources, the success of proper incentive alignment, and the overlap of values in an appreciation of soccer.
Given the reality of international trade issues, the world has an opportunity to take lessons from this year's soccer proceedings and use the WC framework as a blueprint for cooperation in this space. The experience of this WC is especially relevant given the nature of the interactions and relationships it created between North American countries. As we move forward to support North American cooperation, it will be important to assess the economic benefits and costs of such cooperation and ensure the mechanisms at play promote economic development in the region.
