

Transcript, April 8, 2011

The National Conversation at the Woodrow Wilson Center In Search of a New Security Narrative

<Jane Harman> Good afternoon, good afternoon. Welcome to this overflow audience. There is a second room down the hall with people who will participate in today's conversation and are invited to submit questions. To those who are federal employees in the audience I hope we see you here on Monday. Keith Ellison will do everything he can to keep our government open and I would not like to think of this or our magical Wilson Center dinner last night as the last supper [laughter].

I'm Jane Harman, the new director, president and CEO of the Wilson Center and today we roll out a new signature series called "The National Conversation." Woodrow Wilson said, "We live in an age disturbed, confused, bewildered, afraid of its own forces, in search not merely of its road but even of its direction." This century-old observation is directly relevant today and to what shapes the work of the Wilson Center. No one has missed the transformation taking place in the Middle East and North Africa but many Americans are still confused for example about the U.S. role in Libya. Why we intervene militarily to create a no-fly-zone when we have not done so in many other Middle East countries, countries which I would argue pose greater strategic threats to us. Many remember the horror in Rwanda when we failed to act and Bosnia where ethnic cleansing continued despite a no-fly-zone. But both occurred before 9/11.

Now, America is involved in interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq and our economy is hemorrhaging debt and deficits with high unemployment numbers, decreasing at glacial speeds. More than ever we need a shared vision that defines the international role of the United States in the 21st century. We need a lens through which we can understand and prioritize our commitments, financial and human. The question before our panel today is, how do we determine that shared vision, especially with Congress plagued by toxic partisanship? Earlier today, in fact at midnight, the Wilson Center released a white paper written by 2 actively serving US military officers under the authorship of Mr. Y. Today's panel will use that paper to frame a discussion about the strategic narrative we need.

As its new president and CEO, I view this institution as a safe political space to hold some of the essential debates that do not occur easily or productively in Congress or in other halls of power. And so as I mentioned today's discussion is a first. Let me welcome the members of our panel. First, a favorite of mine, General Brent Scowcroft, president of The Scowcroft Group, an international business advisory firm, and former US National Security Adviser to presidents Ford and George H.W. Bush. Then the Honorable Anne-Marie Slaughter, currently a professor of politics in International Affairs at Princeton, former dean of Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs often confused with the Woodrow Wilson Center.

[Laughter]

>> Yeah, I wonder why?

>> Former director of Policy Planning at the U.S. Department of State but most important like me one of the former vaunted research assistants to the late Harvard law professor and former legal adviser Abram Chayes. Congressman Keith Ellison, who is serving his second term representing the 5th district of Minnesota and sits on the House Financial Services Committee. No one missed Keith's moving testimony last month before the House Homeland Security Committee. Robert Kagan, senior fellow at Brookings and expert and frequent commentator on US national security and foreign policy, Washington Post columnist and former State Department policy planning officer. Steve Clemons, blogger extraordinaire, a senior fellow and the founder of the American Strategy Program at the New America Foundation. And our moderator Tom Friedman, best-selling author, a long-time foreign affairs columnist for the New York Times, winner of three Pulitzer prizes, and most important, former scholar here at the Wilson Center.

[Laughter]

<LtGen Brent Scowcroft> Former scholar.

<Tom Friedman> That's right.

[Laughter]

[Simultaneous Talking]

>> This is going to be a lively afternoon. [Laughter] Foremost I will now dwell on this comment, listen up, former scholar at the Wilson Center where he wrote my favorite book of his, *From Beirut to Jerusalem*. That book written in the '80s is still as true now and as relevant now as it was then to what's going on in the Middle East. You should know that Tom is finishing a new book with a provocative title, *That Used to Be Us*. It will be published this fall and as I think about that title and cringe I hope that maybe today's discussion will change his mind.

Finally, let me recognize a few Wilson Center board members and friends in the audience, Ambassador Joe Gildenhorn, who is chairman of our board. I think Susan Hutchinson is not here. You are here. There you are but you were not here last night? I've got it. [Laughter] Sam and Jan Donaldson, Sam heads the Wilson Center Council. Ambassador Arturo Sarukhan of Mexico, there he is, whom I have adopted and I'm now giving active assignments on behalf of the Wilson Center. And I think former Senator Don Riegle is here. Is he here? He's not here. Thank you all for being here. Let me inform you that at least Congressman Ellison has to leave promptly at 1:30. I think several of you do so we will keep this thing moving. We have an ace moderator who will do this and who I know will allow plenty of time for audience questions. "The National Conversation" as the say on the tube begins right now. [Laughter]

[Applause]

<Friedman> Well, thank you all for coming and Jane thank you for hosting this and it's a great way to kick off the Harman era at the Wilson Center. We do have a great panel. I happen to know Mr. Y and so I am so pleased 'cause I have, you know, been a party to some of the evolution in their thinking. So, I'm pleased to be a moderator here to air out this idea and I can give it the attention and I think and hopefully an intelligent criticism that it deserves and I don't think there is any better place to start than with Anne-Marie who is gonna give us a quick overview and then--each of our panelists comment and then we'll have a little discussion up here. And then we'll open it up to the floor. So Anne-Marie, kick it off.

<Anne Marie Slaughter> Thank you. So, I am also very happy to be part of rolling this out. Many of us have been talking to the authors for a while and we think it's an important set of ideas. It's great to be able to roll it out at the Woodrow Wilson Center under Jane Harman. Let me start by saying what this is not. It is not a national security strategy. We have one of those. I hope you all have read it. We have national security strategies with every administration every four years. That's not what this is. This is a national strategic narrative. Three long words to say it's a story about where the United States is in the world and where we want to be and how we get there. And it answers the questions that many, many, many Americans are asking. Suddenly we don't quite know ourselves, indeed the title of Tom's new book really captures that. A sense of having lost our bearings or simply not having the certainties that we had in the Cold War when the national strategic narrative was we were leader of the free world, we wanted to expand the free world, we wanted to stand for the values of democracy and justice and liberty everywhere but particularly against the Soviet Union.

>> That's a story you can tell in a couple of sentences. We don't have that story today. So that is what this document weighs out and at the very least it ought to open a national conversation exactly as this session is titled. Let me give you the one sentence version of the national strategic narrative and five key points about the world we're in and how we should adjust to it. So, I have to start by saying we don't have a snappy--it does not have a snappy formulation as leader of the free world. It says that in an interconnected world the United States should be the strongest competitor and the greatest source of credible influence. The nation that is most able to influence what happens in the international sphere while standing for security, prosperity, and justice at home and abroad. So: competition, influence domestic strength, five key shifts that this narrative acknowledges and then actually proposes how we should respond to.

So the first is from control to influence. It's a fairly simple argument. We were never able to control international events but we had a much better possibility during the Cold War when you essentially had a bipolar world with two principal actors than we do in a world of countless state and non state actors. Nobody controls anything in the 21st century, indeed it's just not a very good century to be--it's not a good time to be a control freak. [Laughter] Whether it's your e-mail or global events it sort of the same problems. What you can do is influence outcomes. And I actually think there is a nice parallel here when President Obama was talking about leadership in his recent speech on Libya he said, "We

created the coalitions and conditions for others to be able to step up." We had a tremendous influence both at the UN and in our own diplomacy for influencing something we still don't know the outcome of but certainly we couldn't control it. So we have to start by saying it's an open system, you can't control it but you can build up your credible influence. Second, from containment to sustainment. Containment of course, really the founder of our strategic narrative during the Cold War, George Kennan. We can't--it doesn't make sense to talk about containing. Whom would we contain? What we need to do is focus on building our selves up in a sustainable ways. We need to invest in our own sustainable resources, our young people, our education, our infrastructure, our environment. That is the secret to our power, the source of our influence going forward from containment to sustainable prosperity at home and strength. Third is really sort of in many ways part of the core of this narrative. From deterrence and defense which of course, again, were the hallmarks of the Cold War narrative to civilian engagement and competition. So part of that is moving away from an overemphasis on military assets toward a greater emphasis on civilian assets and here I'm proud to say the State Department and USAID have been strongly working on exactly that and our military has been very supportive of building up our civilian assets. But equally important: we move from deterrence, which is essentially a negative posture--it stopping things from happening--to active competition. And one of the strongest parts of this narrative is it says, we're afraid to compete. Something's happened in the American psyche where we're afraid to compete. We can still compete. We can out-compete and we have to--that has to be a core part of our strategic narrative.

Fourth, from zero-sum to positive-sum politics. Here again, this is something many sophisticated commentators have been writing about for quite a while. We've moved from a zero-sum world, again, think about that bipolar if the Soviet Union was up we were down and vice versa. Just many, many situations that are much better characterized by win-win than by or positive sum than by zero sum. And finally, from national security to national security and prosperity, now you think, "Well, great so let's add another noun." It's a deeper point than that. My generation has had our whole foreign policy world defined by national security but national security only entered the national lexicon in the late 1940s. It was a way of combining defense and foreign affairs in the context of our post World War II rising Soviet Union. And we shaped most of our foreign policy through a national security lens. National security and prosperity embraces this idea that our strength is much more about our domestic investment and our civilian engagement and our ability to [coughs] it broadens that lens. It doesn't say national security is not important. Of course it's important but it is too confining and too narrow narrative to guide our investments and our own sense of who we are. So, with those five points and I think I will leave it and open it to conversation.

<Friedman> It was a great summary.

<Slaughter> Thank you.

<Friedman> Thank you very much. Brent I want to defer to you, you're the senior member of this panel.

[Inaudible Remark]

[Laughter]

>> And you've been a practitioner as well. And so, give us your reaction to this. Is it relevant? Is it helpful at this time?

<LtGen Brent Scowcroft> I think it's both relevant and helpful. What I like--I like the paper, I like Elise's summary.

<Friedman> Anne-Marie.

<Scowcroft> I think that we ought to put it in what I would call a historical framework because I think we're facing a historical discontinuity and the author has referred to the Treaty of Westphalia and so on. The Treaty of Westphalia recognized the existence of the nation state system codified it and so on. That was a replacement for the feudal system where our sovereignty was vague, divided between kings and princes and landowners and religious leaders. It created a new system and I think the epitome of the nation state system was the 20th century. I think that globalization writ large is changing that system and globalization is eroding national borders. What do I mean by globalization? It is a much overworked word but it's the kind of integration of the world that's happening whether it's healthcare, whether it's climate change, whether it's information technology and so on. And I think this Middle East crisis is a good example of it as was the financial crisis of 2008. The financial crisis of 2008 showed us we've got a global economic system. What happened in one country spread immediately around. It also showed we don't have a global way to deal with a global economic situation. What happened in the Middle East? You know there had been unrest in the Middle East for a long time, what happened this time? Information technology has politicized the world's people in a way they never have been. Most of the world's people, take Middle East for example, a lot of discontent and so on but not mobilized, not energized. And now everybody has TV, radio, cellphone, what have you. They're aware of what's going on in the world and they react to it immediately. So, they're politicized in a way they haven't been. Secondly, the existence of things like Facebook and so on which I barely understand. But what they do is accomplish the thing that's been hardest in showing resentment. How do you organize and run demonstrations? It used to be a highly dangerous operation. Now you can do it on--you can turn on a million people in 10 minutes on Facebook, turnout at Tahrir Square at 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. Now, this force of globalization to me is the best way to look at it is akin to the force of industrialization 250 years ago. Industrialization really created the modern nation state with a lot more power over its citizens and to deal with issues than the earlier Westphalian state system had. And it brought the state together. It made it more powerful. Globalization is reacting the same way but in the opposite direction. It is diluting the power of the nation state to deal with the important things.

>> More and more issues, you have to reach outside national borders to get cooperation to deal with them. Climate change, health issues, you go on and on, terrorism, all of these. And I think what we're seeing now and what this paper shows clearly, well not so

clearly because it's not explicated but what it shows is we're in an uneasy transition now historically between the world of the nation state system and this globalized world where the nation state system is no longer the organization that can deal successfully with all these. How it will come out? I don't have a clue. How long it will take? A hundred years? A thousand years? I don't know. But it seems to me it's this uneasy relationship between the nation state and the powers that are undermining the nation state that the authors so aptly try to deal with.

<Friedman> Brent, thank you very much. Bob, give us your take on this.

<Robert Kagan> Well, I'm glad Brent put it in a historical context because I tend to think about things historically too and we are a little bit simplistic sometimes in looking back on our previous history including our most, including the Cold War. I mean, even when Anne Marie, everybody says this so it's not particularly--I'm not blaming you whatever it says we had all the certainties during the Cold War. I recall a few disagreements. [Laughter] Starting with the Cold War including the disagreement as to whether the Cold War was the right frame of reference and so that's point one. Point two is it's certainly right when Anne-Marie says that we did not--we should never assume that we had any idea of control during the Cold War. The monuments to, you know, the success of containment can be found in Europe. In Asia it was nothing but catastrophe. If you think about the time when the United States was supposed to be most powerful nation in the world where the world was our oyster and run by our best and our brightest the way we used to be. [Laughter] Dean Acheson and Harry Truman in the 1950s, if you look at the period from 1945 to 1955 and you think about the Chinese revolution, you think about the Korean War, you think about--all of which by the way had very important and long lasting strategic ramifications for us not to mention the Soviet explosion of the hydrogen bomb, et cetera, et cetera. Let's not fantasize about the past as a way of beating ourselves up about the present. And that's particularly true if you go back, God forbid, before the Cold War and think about an America -- we were still America -- We were having meetings like this in fact of one nation or another. There was no paradigm. There was no easy paradigm for American foreign policy from at least the 1880s through World War II. It was one series of confusions and misguided steps and we thought we were this but then we turned out to be that and the story of us getting into World War I is the best tale of that. And I'll just end with this. By the way let me first--I should have said at the beginning. I do welcome this paper. [Laughter] I think that any, right, I'm mostly arguing with it, but I do welcome it because any discussion of our narrative is an important discussion because we certainly should be thinking about these issues and I agree with some of the basic core elements of this paper. But I--when I think about the past I get worried when we start to think that everything that's happening now is brand new and I'm particularly thinking now about the issue of globalization. Because if you do go back and look at the late 19th century and early 20th century and read the writings about--that people were saying in that period they were astounded at what had happened in the world. They were undergoing a communications revolution that was unprecedented. The laying down of the telegraph, the steamship, the ability to cross oceans in a matter of days, the ability to communicate instantaneously. This was a marvel and including in people who thought about strategy and what was going to happen in the world. And the

assumption was that because of this incredible interconnectedness and particularly economic interconnectedness that they had entered a new era. That the old rules of power, the old geopolitical conflicts they weren't gonna happen anymore because nations and peoples were bound so closely together. And some of the most brilliant expressions of this whether it's Norman Angell's book in 1909 came about five years before the outbreak of World War I. Now, I don't think we're five years from the outbreak of World War I but I think it is important to ask this question, what has changed, what stays the same? I am less convinced that the nation state is on its way out. If anything I would say since the 1990s the nation state has made a kind of comeback. A lot of this argument about how the nation state was withering away began in the 1990s. Jessica Mathews' Power Shift laid it all out in 1994. But we have actually seen surprising resilience by the nation state. Now maybe its illusion, maybe it's just about to crack but maybe it's a little bit more with us than we think. And that the--I'm gonna end by just saying this, the thing that I think the paper lacks a little bit is a description of what--of how the world works, you know, in the sense of do we still believe in a core realist point that power interaction among nation states is still important because if it is, and I think it is, you can't quite get rid of deterrents. You can't go to Japan today or South Korea today or nation's on the periphery of Iran today and say you don't believe in deterrents. So, I would say yes, let us compete, let us by all means become prosperous. I'm all for that. I'm not sure what that means. It must be the Steve Martin joke, you know, you could be a millionaire and never pay taxes first get a million dollars. I'm all for prosperity but as we move forward let's not kid ourselves that we have safely steered out of precisely the 20th century. I'm not at all convinced we've left either the 20th century or the 19th century in terms of some fundamental issues having to do with power.

<Friedman> You know, let me take up one thing and use my prerogative because I think you've focused on a really important issue about which is, you know, what's new and what's not, you know, basically. And on this issue of globalization I think it's very important that you do not have to believe that there is something new going on today to accept the argument that the nation state is gonna wither away in terms of what is new with globalization. Let me explain. Because, you see my own view on this is that, yes if you define globalization purely as trade, then in some ways there is a straight line between what was going on in the 19th and 18th century and where we are today. But if you define it as something much broader than just trade as the ability to act globally, there is something fundamentally new today. I would argue that the globalization of the 18th and 19th century was spearheaded first by countries globalizing. They were the agent of globalization and then by companies globalizing. What to me is new today fundamentally new which this paper I think touches on or is built around is a difference of degree that is a difference of kind. What is new today about the globalization is the ability of individuals, individuals to compete, connect and collaborate globally as individuals. It is of a level of discontinuity with any kind of globalization I would argue by degree that we have ever seen before. Now, where I would agree with you, I have either view that the state matters more not less in this world because the state in many ways people still live in communities, in clusters, they need infrastructure, they need rule of law. The state is actually the plug with which you plug into this world and that plug is corrupted, corroded, you know, and block--your interaction with this world we can see

will be corrupted and corroded. So, I think you can still believe in the state and you can believe that there is something fundamentally new. I just want to put that out because I think the globalization--

<Kagan> Just put it out there or do you want me to respond to it?

[Laughter]

<Friedman> Just put it out there and then you and I are going to argue about this. Steve and then we're gonna let Keith close.

<Steve Clemons> Well, first of all I want to commend Wayne Porter and Puck Mykleby for putting out this paper. I also agree that it's important to initiate--

<Friedman> Who are they?

<Clemons> A serious--

[Laughter]

>> Mr. Y, are we allowed to tell them who they are?

[Simultaneous Talking]

>> In any case, you know, when I think about it and I agree with so much of what has been said already. But when I think about power and states, power is essentially a function of future expectations. And I almost want to rename their paper from what is it? The national strategic narrative.

>> This is not going to be viral title [laughter] to something like how to position the United States as the Google of nations rather than the General Motors of nation. I mean America is a very well brand--

[Inaudible Remark].

>> I mean, the point of this paper [laughter] the point of this paper and what is embedded in it with which was I agree although they tried to dismissed the declinists, which I'm not. I'm taking a realistic assessment which I have I know you do Tom. Is the United States is facing a situation today where it's very well branded. There are lots of expectations of it. It has enormous capacities around the world that are somewhat sprawling but collectively it's just not adding up to be--to weigh in as the defining edge of what's going on in the world. China today looks like the Google of nations. As Anne Marie pointed out in her comment it is a much smaller economy, et cetera, but it is what people think 20 years from now that matters that give China, gives China a premium on power today. We don't enjoy that premium of power. There is so much global doubt about America's ability to achieve its objectives. That doubt is almost like the stock market. It may have over shot

frankly about where American power really is and what we can do. But fundamentally this paper is trying I think in a hopeful way and also waving in some realism trying to say that we need to take stock. Look at what's really happening and begin taking stock of what Brent was laying out in terms of globalization. What globalization really is, is the disruption of cartels. What blogging is in individual blogging is saying I'm not gonna wait to the New York Times editor to tell me no any more or [laughter] to say yes three weeks from now. You know, it is the disruption of cartels and that is happening in every sector of society.

<Friedman> I'd say it's disruption of hierarchies, of all kinds.

>> Right, exactly. And, where, I think this paper and, you know, where discussions of this will become important or not is the degree to which they begin to inform hard choices. If, as this paper says, or where the national strategy paper President Obama puts out, says that you're gonna invest in your country, you gonna reinvest in infrastructure. I see the United States government engaged in a lot of fig leaf action and essentially does modest things that fundamentally don't move the dial. They don't fundamentally get it off the course it is, whether it's investment and infrastructure or jobs programs or trying to figure out how the global economy works. Even the debates about the free trade agreement which are gonna be ferocious are not fundamentally consequential to the US economy one way the other. They were not really thinking through the paradigms that I think we need to do. The other thing that I did when I was reading this paper I try to read it. I read it three times. I tried to read it from the perspective of a Chinese strategic player. Then I realized that we've seen this before historically. Japan tried very hard. We look at Japan as sort of on its back right now but there was a point when the Japan as you know was, you know, we looked it as the real threat. As a nation that didn't have a large standing military capacity though it has a lot military capacity in Pacific but economically it was ravenous and highly capable. And in Japan's story to itself its own narrative was part of our sovereignty comes from what we do as a nation and part of our sovereignty comes from the interdependence with other nations. And Japan embedded itself deeply in the institutions of global stewardship and global management across the board. They send Koichiro Matsuura to UNESCO. Today we have Amano who is running the IAEA. We had Sadako Ogata here yesterday who used to be the UN... They invest--that was their strategy. And to me this sounds like a Japan-like strategy from the past that we're being--that is being advocated and I'm not sure I'm comfortable with that. Because fundamentally the challenge for the United States with a much more fragile and--we were just in Jane Harman's office she's got this cool surf board and I kinda think the challenge is learning how to surf these waves then it that to become a good surfer to recapture the imagination of the American public and the global public frankly is almost to identify this as a Nixonian moment where you've got great global doubt America's capabilities. We need to demonstrate an ability somewhere, whether it's for Iran, whether it's how we deal with other nations, or how we deal with what Brent identified as, you know, these forces of globalization. And show that we can either move that needle to basically recapture the imagination, change the way global gravity works that would be a very good investment for the United States. Otherwise, we need to come back to what Bob Kagan just said find the Dean Acheson. Maybe it's Kagan. Some of that sort just sort

of look at how do you reorder global institutions so that rather than having a dominant American or American-led hierarchy that instead what you've cultivated is a network node of responsible stockholders. You know, kind of a stockholder internationalism if you will. And all of that is possible. I think the paper lays the ground work for that hopeful and realistic narrative. We need to take in a lot farther.

<Friedman> I wanna finish with my congressman, Keith Ellison.

[Laughter]

<Rep Keith Ellison > That's right in the 5th Congressional District in Minnesota I represent the District that Tom grew up with same [inaudible].

>> Well, there's no doubt that adjustment is needed. Me, no matter we can look at this thing in a long historical lens and you know, we can come to the conclusion, well, you know, that involve new things. I mean, there's a lot of things that had been around before. But without regard to that we still have a lot of adjustments to make because where we are, where we wanna be isn't the same place. So we gotta do some adjusting. I think there is a growing consensus that we need a world that is more, we need to be more nimble in the world, we need to focus on prosperity, we need to focus on our own prosperity and we need to do a number of things identified in the paper that to be--to meet the challenges of the new--the world we--coming into. But I think the real problem is alignment and the difficulties in getting aligned. So for example, if we wanna go from a defense and deterrence model to engagement and competition, you know, we gotta deal with the fact that we have, you know, say a military structure that still has his feet in the Soviet era. And it's not just a matter of generals deciding to make some changes. If we look at the F-35 debate in congress, you know, we--they had spread, you know, there were interest spread across the country and members of congress fighting over whether we should adapt the alternative engine or not based on jobs and their community. So this is an adjustment issue. If we're gonna go from, you know, deterrence and defense, actually it has a lot of economic implications right on main street. So how are we gonna make that adjustment, you know, it's gonna be tough. And then of course if wanna we get to the world where we have a smaller military but were engaging more, there's huge budgetary implications to that. And so, you know, I'd like to see us double the number of people who are diplomats around the country. I'd like to see us--

[Inaudible Remark]

>> You know, get out there and allow USAID to be a free-standing cabinet position so that it can think long term about development and lead diplomacy in the day to date to the State Department. That's a big heavy politically lift. So, I think that we do need to make, we do need to make the adjustments but making those adjustments is gonna be tough. If you think about the Arab spring for example, how do we make--meet the moment there? You know, our policy has been basically three prong, I think. Basically, United States relationship with the Middle East has been based on oil, Israel, and terrorism. Clearly, were gonna have to meet our energy needs. In the future, hopefully, they won't be so

dependent upon oil, much less foreign oil. But, you know, even when it comes to even trade I think our relationships have been too thin. We need to have richer number of economic connection between us and the Middle East. When it comes to Israel, Israel is our historic ally and is gonna be but can't we get more friends? And things are changing there because we based our relationship with Israel based on it being a friendly, democratic country in a sea of hostile authoritarian--neighborhood. But, you know, if things workout well for the Arab spring, they won't be the only democracy in the neighborhood anymore. And that's what we should hope for. Thing's are gonna be different and then when it comes to counter terrorism, you know, obviously the threats are, they are not government, they are non-state actors, transnational. Do you centralize? We got a lot of change and adjustments to do and its gonna take a lot of lifting and I have, you know, and I hope, I'm an optimistic person, but because our interest have been historic deeply aligned and they are all kinda interest connected to the status quo, you know, I'm just hoping that we can make those changes because its gonna take a lot of thought and a lot of change. And, you know, just to close I mean I think about the debate we have on foreign aid. Right now we got a bunch at least 80 people in congress who would be happy to just get rid of foreign aid. And if I get up on a radio show in Minneapolis talking about our budgetary challenges, I'm sure I'll gonna few callers who would say, "Why are we sending money overseas? Well, we don't have bridges and stuff like that. We have bridges falling down and stuff like that." And then I'll tell them, "Well, you know, it's helping people not to die from AIDS. It's helping people to get clean water. And it's only one percent of the budget." People change when they hear those facts but its not even--it's not even it.

<Slaughter> Well, yes. A little below.

[Laughter]

[Simultaneous Talking]

<Ellison> Anne Marrie you know what I'm thinking about doing? I'm thinking about saying, you know what, I'm gonna take a hardline, I'm a fiscal hawk, absolutely not more than three percent of the budget.

[Laughter]

>> So, okay, you know, we can't go over that. You know, so our perception--

[Inaudible Remark]

>> But, so that you know, so you got the joke, right?

<Friedman> Yeah.

[Laughter]

>> So you the thing is, is that we've got real adjustments to make. I think the new challenges of this world mean that we're gonna have to go up in the area of foreign aid down in our military footprint. Yet the--we're not well positioned to make those transitions.

<Friedman> Thank you, Keith.

<Ellison> So we'd better do that.

<Friedman> Well, let's try to help Mr. Y a little bit now and get really specific, okay? And Brent I wanna go back to you for a second. What do you think is, you know, Bob raised an important question. Look, in a lot of things we're talking about here we were doing these 30 years ago. We like having--using the exact same vocabulary. You know, what is new here today? If you think of being the national security adviser under President Bush and being the national security adviser today, what do you think is fundamentally new that would have to be central to any kind strategic narrative or framing of our challenges today?

<Scowcroft> Well, I thought I said what I thought was basically--

[Laughter]

<Friedman> I want you to say it again.

[Laughter]

<Scowcroft> I'm not talking about the withering away of the state or anything like that. What I'm saying is that out--looking out there is a world that is changing rather fundamentally and we need to react positively to it.

<Friedman> Right.

<Scowcroft> Not negatively. You know, the authors cite lovingly the National Security Act Of 1947 which turned out to be a beautiful act. But it was retrospective. It wasn't forward looking. We found out in World War II the army and the navy didn't talk to each other and the State Department didn't have an intelligence system and stamps. Stimson in the '30s said "gentleman – Secretary of War – gentlemen do not read other gentleman's mail." [Laughter] So it was a look back. We gotta try to look forward and that's what I'd like it be. The world is different. Most of our institutions were built for a world which has disappeared. And the one which is particularly irrelevant is the UN. I mean, it doesn't do-

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<Friedman> Right.

<Scowcroft> Is there some kind of an organization? How do we respond to the next financial crisis? The G21? It was thrown together ad hoc. Those are the---we need to look forward rather than backward that's what I'm saying.

<Friedman> So, Bob I wanna go back to you. So, what do you think that is really central to this paper? What do you think is new today? Or is there really nothing that is sort of fundamentally new from a more realist perspective?

<Kagan> Look, I am not and I'm not saying that nothing is new, I mean.

<Friedman> Sure, but I think it's important to zero in.

<Kagan> There are obviously things that new--that are new. The question is how much do they require us or how much should we change to respond to that?

<Friedman> Yeah.

<Kagan> The information age as we know it, what you're talking about is all true. Where I begin to jump off the train is in thinking that therefore all the old tools of power are no longer relevant. And I don't think the paper is saying that but there is a tendency to move in that direction. Let me just give you an example of how even something new doesn't necessarily change things the way we want them too or the way we expect them too. I'm positive by the way that human nature is not new. So you're kind of dealing with the same beast, and I use the term advisably, as you've been dealing with for millennia. Let's talk about the fact that everyone can communicate with each other on the internet. You know, when people communicate with each other especially across national boundaries sometimes it makes them grow closer. Sometimes it makes them hate each other more. If you read the internet in China now it's hyper nationalistic. Now, you can argue that because that's where the government channel said and because they don't let anybody else or anything else or you could say the internet is a great vehicle for the Chinese people to express their hatred of the Japanese people. It certainly is doing that now. So does that mean the internet is gonna bring nations closer and solve problems? Not necessarily. It could exacerbate problems just the way trade turned out. You can have interconnected trade which exacerbates problems because nations feel that they're falling under disadvantage – some of our tension with China is trade tension, right? So, and therefore I ask so are we out of the business of international competition that can lead to conflict? And because that--

<Friedman> Does this paper presume that in some way?

<Kagan> I think it's not so much of the paper presumes that because I think the gentleman who wrote this paper could not possibly presume that.

<Friedman> Right.

<Kagan> But even when, and this is where I'll say something slightly controversial. Even when we talk about our adaptation to the modern world, the new 21st century world, has to include some shifting away from emphasis on military power. I don't agree with that. I'm not persuaded if that's the case. I personally feel that unfortunately we face a very classic and very traditional kind of power competition with China right now. China is not behaving--in some respect China is the model 21st century nation. That's what people are looking up to. It's the Google nation in a way, censored Google nation. [Laughter] But in some ways China is behaving like every classic rising power of the last three centuries. Behaving like Japan at the end of the 19th century beginning. Behaving like Wilhelmine, Germany. Behaving like the United States at the end 19th century. Believing that to be a great power requires military power. Believing that if you have military power that means other people need to step out of the way a little bit and we're gonna take care of our selves. It doesn't have--you want to posit a hostile mean creepy China.

<Friedman> Right

<Kagan> You just have to pass it a normal nation. They are behaving normally now and therefore I'm not sure that in our dealings with China--of course we want to engage. We've been talking about engagement for decades. I'm not sure that we're gonna be able to in any way abandon the military element of our relationship.

<Friedman> Anne-Marie?

[Laughter]

<Slaughter> So I think the three things that really are new. And the first time you said exactly and you actually pointed to it in *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* which was the super-empowered individual. And now that is even far more true than it was when you wrote *Lexus and the Olive Tree* and you just said it's the ability of individuals to do things that only states could do. Now, we obviously saw that with 9/11 were individuals could actually attack a nation in the way that only other nations have been able to. But now, you know, individuals can actually communicate the way only governments use to be able to communicate. And one of the things that was interesting with WikiLeaks is, you know, are all of our diplomacy was based on the idea that we needed to get information from diplomats and other places. I can tell you, you know, Twitter and the State Department reporting system [laughter] pretty comfortable and Twitter is probably ahead in terms of how much information you can get. So this idea that individuals can act in ways that only states could is definitely new. And second to nature of power is different. I still believe in states. I still believe in military and economic power absolutely the size of your territory and your military and your economy. But there's a whole other dimension of power that simply did not exist before and that is how connected you are. And anybody under 35 understands that immediately whether its how many followers you have, its how many links you have. It's as simple as thinking who is the leader of the terrorist on 9/11? Mohammed Atta. How did we know? He's the only one who is connected to all other 19. The person who is the most connected is the most powerful because they are the person who can mobilize like Wael Ghonim in Egypt. That is the

dimension of power that didn't exist. It's a very important dimension, when you say the Google of nations what I think immediately is the nation that's most plugged in to the global economy, global society has a different dimension of power. And the third thing that's change is absolutely what Steve said about responsibility, responsible stakeholders. What President Obama keeps telling other nations is you wanna be a great power it's not enough to have big economy and a big army and a big territory, you have to take responsibility for enforcing the norms of a global order. Interestingly, even Qatar, little Qatar, when it join the coalition in Libya said, "Well, you know, if you're gonna lead, you have to take responsibility." We have a global order and we have institutions whereby nations actually do take responsibility. That's a real change from the 19th century or even the 20th century. So I would say in all those ways it doesn't negate what was, it's on top of what was but we have to adapt to it. Last thing I'd say 'cause I just--I think one of the reasons this documents is so important: it breaks open a conversation too many democrats in particular have been afraid to have. It breaks open a conversation about military spending. I'm gonna divorce myself in the authors now. They are both serving members of the military. I'm gonna--take this from me.

>> We have to have a more open conversation about the defense budget and our relative priorities and how we're going to spend investing in our individuals, investing in our society as sources of power in lieu of 'cause there gonna some trade-off investing in the traditional means of power. And you can believe we need a strong military as I do and still believe we have to have that conversation and we have to have it a whole lot more openly than we have been willing to have.

<Friedman> Now, you raise a couple really important points and one is the speed of change. I wrote *The World is Flat* in 2005 and Facebook isn't in it.

<Slaughter> That's incredible.

<Friedman> So that I wrote--when I wrote that book Twitter was a sound, 4G was a parking place, Skype was type-o, [laughter] and the cloud was something in the sky. [Laughter] And that's in just five years basically. So, but the other thing that I'm really wrestling with and I think the discussion you and Bob are having that really came through in Tahrir Square, you see, if you really and I had the pleasure and incredible opportunity to be there. If we actually listen to what people were saying, what they really, I would say wanted most they certainly wanted a democracy and freedom. But, if you ask me what they wanted absolutely most, they wanted justice. They live in a deeply unjust context. And so if we think about how do we help them, how do we nourish? Actually, they want justice. It's very interesting, which institution did they go after violently first? They went after the police. The police were the instrument of the injustice. They went after two institutions. They burned down the NDP. That was the state party and they basically would have burned down every police station. The police disappeared. Now, think about how we interface with Egypt. We give them 250 million dollars in economic assistance and 1.3 billion dollars to the Egyptian army. Now, the Egyptian army when it comes to owning real estate and being in business it makes the People's Liberation Army of China look like pikers, okay? And when I think about the conversation we should

actually be having with Egypt now I think it should start by saying to the army guys, just for starters we're talking--you have no predators, you have no natural predators, okay. You're not gonna be attacked by Israel, Sudan, Libya. Actually, you have two predators, poverty and illiteracy. So right off the top we're gonna take this Cold War number 1.3 billion in military aid and first of all we're gonna retrain the police, okay, and we're gonna create a justices system. And then we're gonna use the rest to help you build schools. But there is just something about how we interface. The last thing Egypt needs is more F-16s. I mean, it is so out of context of what actually is emerging there and I really think we need to rethink a lot of that.

<Scowcroft> You need to remember why Egypt gets so many F-16s [laughter]. It had nothing to do...

<Friedman> Yeah, I realize that and that's a conversation we have to have with a certain lobby in Washington. Steve and Keith?

<Clemons> Yeah. But I mean, I think at this point the military thing and some people think it's practically immoral to talk about the cost when their national security issues at stake. In fact, there's such long list of national security issues at stake. At some point you've gotta look at the cause. And if you go back before 9/11 and you look at what we were spending on defense to feel as a safe nation men and you account for inflation overtime, we spent 2.3 trillion dollars above that pre-9/11. That equates to about 7 and a half million sustained jobs in the United States in the private sector. So what you're gonna begin seeing in this budget battle are more and more debates which we will have whether we think they are appropriate or not about people who sort of sense that they are--they are losing as a result of the terms of engagement so that--so we need to turn to a smart strategy. We need to begin thinking about the efficacy of what we're doing. In my book, Afghanistan it's not a very efficacious deployment of American resources with an undependable ally. We're spending 119 billions dollars there in fiscal year 2011 in a country with about 14 billion dollars of GDP. It just seems to me that there might be better options for trying to seduce a different course in that area. I recognized that there are great complexities that it's really about Pakistan but even then I would say that it is an incredible diminishment. And to me whether it, you know, Libya is very complicated and I think that the, you know, and Anne Marie and I go back and forth on this. But whether it's Libya or it's Afghanistan America is increasingly deployed in cases where these look like traps on American power not the leveraging of American power. And that we're becoming less and less seen as a nation that shipping international system towards healthy and better ways. And that, I think what the good part of the narrative--and when you ask what is different today? These things add up in a very short period of time as a super power. The United States didn't have to do these things. Anatol Lieven said America was king of the hill and we kicked down our own hill. That militarily, economically, morally, and with institutions we have demonstrated fundamental limits and the mystique our capacity is gone. It takes a long time to reacquire that mystique again. You just don't go invade a nation and get mystique back. In fact, you probably look diminished because you were forced to do it. And I think that's the dilemma we're in today that we need to work our way out of.

<Friedman> Keith, please.

<Ellison> Well, you know, one thing that's new is we got this enormous youth bubble and I hope we really do spend a lot of time to talking about what it means that so many societies and I think the Middle East is on my mind a lot these days. What it means if you have all these societies where 50 percent of the population is under 18 years old? You know this is--this has big implications. I mean, this is a demographic reality that is gonna have vast implications for the United States. So one thing is not going away as lots of these people who are 18 years old, their cohort just moves through. You know, they're gonna be there a long--and they have demands, they're gonna have needs, they're gonna have expectations. You mentioned justice. They expect us to act justly. And I--when people talk about anti-Americanism for me part of what's going on is unmet expectations not just we don't like it. And so, you know, that's gonna be going on not to mention jobs, not to mention how they would challenge the governments that are under them. And then you know Anne Marie mentioned the part about the super-powered individual, well, that's just, you know, the youth bubble plus that. It just changes things in an exponential way. So, and then this means a lot for, you know, this whole military security discussion. Because I'm not, I mean I believe our country should have a strong military, but I don't think the present composition of it is needs to be what it is. I mean, it may really need to do some serious adjustments to meet the security challenges. And I think part of what we think of in security, you know, you can't move the kinetic part of it. It's to really think about the development inside of it and how we bring people along and try to meet those expectations. And I--and I'll say, you know, I think the president gets this because you know he listen to that Cairo speech and he listens to entrepreneur summit with some things that he's done. It's very clear to me that he understands the need for the adjustment but the problem is aligning what we--what we know--where we know we should go with where we are and how there are budget---there are so many sets of expectations around keeping us where we're at.

[Simultaneously Talking]

<Scowcroft> On a military side. I think Bob Gates made one of the most telling statements a couple years ago. We need to prepare for the wars we are likely to fight not the ones we would like to fight. And I think this whole thing you have 22--all of these goes to that and it's a tremendous part of the defense budget.

<Friedman> We have a question from the floor and let me just preface by saying that the book I'm writing actually I'm a co-author with Michael Mandelbaum from John's Hopkins and Michael recently published the book called *The Frugal Superpower* which basically says sooner or later this is gonna catch up to us and we're gonna have to make some choices. And I was thinking about it this morning 'cause I read Peggy Noonan's column in the Wall Street Journal this morning. I commend it to everyone because it basically is a surprise. It's a get out of Afghanistan column. It basically said--

[Inaudible Remark]

>> Oh, really? I didn't realize she was there. I'm sorry but I--it just sort of posed this whole issue of deficits versus schools. And so you know, the question we haven't but I wanna pose it to, how does our federal deficit cut down on our ability to influence the new international system? The way I pose it is should, the author is here that can you talk about foreign policy today, defense policy, national security policy without having a strong opinion on sort of domestic--this domestic debate on deficits, spending and actually say here is what I feel about this 'cause therefore I want to invest more here because this is how I see the world?

<Kagan> Well, obviously not and but I find that there sometimes when I hear the discussion about how the military has to be reduced because of our budget deficit, I in some cases, I'm not talking about the panel here, I know that the same people were calling for the military to be reduced when we didn't have a budget deficit. And we've got an overlay. What we really have in some respects is a let's redefine the American mission which is a very legitimate debate which we've been having for 200 years. So, and we will continue to have.

>> If we are just in fact talking about dollars and cents, I cannot take seriously any claim that our national security--that our national health as a nation is being harmed by the percentage of money we spent on the defense and--or could be saved by cutting let's say 10 percent out of defense budget. If you're not talking about entitlement programs which--to say that they dwarf the defense spending issue is the under--is an understatement. I had a very friendly and enjoyable discussion of debate with Alice Rivlin who wants to cut defense budget because her argument is you have to have--everyone has to take their fair share. I understand that argument. But if you ask Alice Rivlin, does cutting the defense budget by let's say 10 percent have anything to do with the catastrophic out year deficits that we face? She would say no. That's not what's driving those deficits. What's driving those deficits is entitlement spending and other kinds of things. So, I would like to have a national security discussion about entitlement spending. Look, I am opposed to dumb wars. I want a strategy where we fight no dumb wars only smart wars. [Laughter] Let's stipulate. I hate to--I'm all for that.

<Slaughter> I'm opposed.

<Kagan> I know. [Laughter] I love all this, I love all this smart powers, smart test. I'm for smart. Some people are for dumb but I'm for smart. And I would not say, yeah, let's go into Afghanistan and spend nine years not winning there. That would not be my strategy. But this is not the first dumb war we fought. There was something called the Vietnam War. Lost something like 55,000 Americans

<Audience> 58

<Kagan> 58, thank you. Now you can tell me how much it cost? It probably cost a lot, I'm thinking. It did not end the United States first of all. And when we talk about America's diminished appearance in the world I'm thinking 1968 was not a high moment

for America's appearance in the world. And yet we recovered, you know. We have fought so many dumb wars. I see a great historian in the audience right here who knows how many dumb wars we fought. We're gonna fight more of them I guarantee it. But that doesn't mean that therefore we could say, okay, just we gotta get ahead of this business because the reasons we get into these wars sometimes are often very good reasons. And so that's why I don't think we can just say, we're fighting dumb wars let's cut back on this. But we do need to deal with the deficit and just to get back to your point. You can hold military spending at the rate of inflation and have no discernible impact and probably get what we need in the near term. I just think that the military budget should not be the focus of our discussion on this.

<Friedman> Anne Marie?

<Slaughter> I would say the military budget should not be the only focus. I think we agree. I would totally agree we have to have a discussion about entitlements just in some ways the same arguments that the paper is making which is we really have to invest in the sources of our power which are the sustainable resources we have at home starting with our young people, starting with education, starting with actually training people to be competitive in this economy. And as far as I'm concerned that certainly includes entitlements. That's a--you know, that a redistribution of resources between the older generation and the younger generation that since I'm smack in the middle I can see that display of feeling very strongly it seem the equities on both sides. But, I also think there has to be a conversation about the budget. If only in the ways Keith said, you know, what you could do diplomatically, what you could do in terms of development, how you would be engaging on the civilian side that we would have done in Afghanistan, what we should have done in the 1990s before we ever had to fight the war ... In the 1990s had we been thinking about investing in Afghanistan, in the kind of society we wanted to see instead of abandoning them the minute the Soviets pulled out, we could be in a different place today. So let's just stipulate that I think we need to have that conversation across the board. But, again, one of the powers of this paper is a bipartisan narrative where it's a nonpartisan narrative. It's just a nonpartisan narrative that invites us to have that conversation with a broader concept of where our security really lies.

<Friedman> Let's do it 'cause I wanna open the floor if we you could. Just get some questions

<Ellison> But I gotta go.

<Friedman> Oh you gotta go, oh I'm so sorry. Then you trump everything

<Ellison> But so.

<Friedman> Is the government gonna shutdown?

[Laughter]

<Ellison> We don't know yet.

<Friedman> Oh yeah.

<Kagan> If it's not, you don't have to go.

[Laughter]

<Friedman> Please, I'm sorry.

[Inaudible Remark]

<Ellison> All I wanna do is thank you and all panelists. I learned a lot being able to be here and I wish I could stay here for the dialogue 'cause I know I'm gonna learn a lot more. My friend Jane Harman, thank you very much for all you do. It's so good to see you again and you of course, you know, it's a thrill to see Mr. Donaldson here, you know, I used to watch him on TV.

[Laughter]

<Friedman> Very encouraging.

<Audience> We'll watch you on TV.

<Ellison> One of these days.

<Friedman> > Keith, thank you very much.

<Ellison> Thanks a lot everybody.

>> I appreciate it.

[Applause]

<Friedman> So let's use this as a moment to open it up to the floor. Here we got some questions. The first one I took was from the overflow room. I want--please if you'd stand up and identify yourself and your question.

[Inaudible Remark]

<Friedman> There's a microphone there if you take that, thanks.

<Audience> Thank you. What this paper does is asks us to look at the narrative, the overarching narrative by which we say who we are, why we're here and what we're all about in the world. And what we know about narrative is it's a set of assumptions, it's a set of beliefs and it determines everything that we do. And what we know about budgets

which this conversation has moved toward a lot is that the budget is the out picturing of our narrative. It's the conversation about how we actually do what we think who we think we are and what we think we're here to do and be. So, my question actually I'm sorry Representative Ellison left because he was getting to this. How do we align a narrative in a changing world when we see through the budget conversation that there are vastly different narratives, vastly different stories about who we are and what we're about?

<Friedman> Steve, do you want to take a crack at that?

<Clemons> Yeah, and it's a great question and it's a tough question. In my book, I think you need to shift sort of where Brent Scowcroft was saying is you need to first embrace the fact that lots has to change. This is a town of risk-averse institutions, a town of inertia, a town of vested interests. It's not a town that really embraces the notion of how do you pivot very quickly and rapidly in a different direction. So, fundamentally you need to begin putting out narratives like this. Ann Marie oversaw the QDDR, Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. You know, and people may read it and say, well, it's not the, you know, the thing that would keep them all night reading.

<Slaughter> Bestseller.

<Clemons> Bestseller but it is an effort to rebalance and shift the discussion about some of the tasks the United States faces. For instance, I found it fascinating watching in Egypt and Libya the interaction between Hillary Clinton and Bob Gates. Hillary Clinton is on a hard drive to reassert the State Department's statutory authority as the lead in all of these issues. When I sit in White House meetings I hear the admirals and the generals defer for the first time ever in these kinds of meetings to this State Department. Now, it may be a fig leaf again. It may be symbolic but it's at least the beginning that--if you watch the budget debates and you read the papers and you read where some of the critics of the administration have been, you would think the Pentagon is the be all the, you know, do all and that's all there. They didn't notice what Susan Rice and Hillary Clinton pulled off in terms of building in an international consensus and there is very little respect for the role of diplomacy in the world. Now, that's just one piece of this. I think there are a lot of other areas where I think as a surfer of the trends in world I think the United States has to reinvent its capacity almost like in the 1968 moment to convince other nations that it still has it if you will. I think it's valuable for the world to think it still has it. We've, you know, jumped into things too quickly in my view. I would say Libya may be one of those cases but we jumped in too quickly without necessarily thinking about, you know, America is about doing great and good things in the world, sure. But it needs to make sure that the stock of power that it had before it made those efforts remain--keeps it able to do something the next day. And if it doesn't, I think that becomes in my book a reason for not necessarily jumping forward that we tend to be very emotional right now. And so part of realigning budgets or statutory authority with what our narrative has to be, has to be thinking through the structural dimensions a lot more and just dealing with the fact that this town is not good at it. And you've got to embrace change to some degree and the notion of that and make that even if you screw up, even if you flop. Part of what made Silicon Valley and frankly what made America so great was embracing failure and

realizing that defeat was a way you could get ahead and win in certain cases. And we don't do that in Washington.

<Friedman> Let's keep going. Please, right over there and then we'll move around.

<Audience> John Norris from the Center for American Progress, you know, I've read the paper as a very powerful indictment of our public choices and how we're oriented towards the world. But it's striking to me in the panel how little mentioned September 11 got in the discussion. And it is the primary reason why we doubled our defense budget. It is the primary reason why we have a hard time seeing civilian agencies as a key component of our international approach.

>> And I'm wondering how much do we collectively as foreign policy professionals really have a duty to push back and collectively say to our fellow citizens and our nation, we went a little bit off the deep end honestly after September 11th. We really need to reorient our priorities and we need to do some of the things that the authors talked about so powerfully and beginning to look at the economy, the environment, agriculture, energy in a systematic way and in a sustainable way and reorient our priorities in a pretty powerful way.

<Friedman> I think it's a good question. I mean, you know, if I could rephrase it just a little bit. Do we need a post 9/11 commission?

[Laughter]

<Clemons> Good question--

[Simultaneous Speaking]

<Scowcroft> Well, I don't think the commission is the right--the 9/11 commission did a great job in analyzing what happened then they went on to say what we ought to do in the future and they had no basis for it. Their hearings were not. It was blue sky. I think we are not very good at, what Steve said, analyzing the long term consequences of what we do. You mentioned somebody, I can't remember who it was, wrote a piece today: we have to get out of Afghanistan. Well, the first thing to do is what happens if we get out? What are the forces unleashed and are we not 2 years, 5 years, 10 years ahead? Or are we in a situation where we've got a whole Asian conflict with the Indians, the Chinese and so on? It's not that simple. How we got into Afghanistan if we weren't there we wouldn't go there now. There is no question about it. But it's the application of foresight which as Steve said is the hardest thing in Washington to do. And it's getting harder and I think because of blogs, because everybody's opinion is equal to everybody else's.

<Clemons> That is a big problem. I want to support that.

[Laughter]

<Kagan> Except your blog. You know, as we have this very intelligent conversation let's try to avoid incredible platitudes. When I hear people say, why are we spending so much time in Afghanistan when we should be fixing our economy? Well, first of all I don't think that everybody has said, let's stop fixing our economy while we're in Afghanistan. I think fixing our economy is probably a difficult problem which has nothing to do with whether we're in Afghanistan or whether we're bombing Libya, whether we're doing anything else. Let's fix our economy, let's fix our environment why aren't we focusing on those issues, you know? And when people come to office, new administrations they don't come to office and say let's dig right in and do whatever the last guy was doing. They always come in and say we're gonna do this different. This administration, can we make a list of all the things--if you think about foreign policy that this administration was gonna go do different and then put it up against the list of all the things that look an awful a lot like what the previous administration did and the administration before that and the administration before that et cetera, et cetera and that's what I mean, you know, what I might say is not that this town is averse to change. Sometimes people come in to here and think change is easier than it is but there are enduring realities that we have to grapple with that keeps sucking us into. We're not in a rut because we're stupid--are we, okay, we're stupid but we're in a rut because the problems are a rut. I just think that this let's wave the magic wand and fix our economy stuff we just need to be careful.

<Clemons> Tom just a real quick two-hander. The thing that, you know, there is a historical metaphor that I think is very important. It would be great if the Wilson Center took it up, which is to look at what Eisenhower did which is to engineer a true strategic debate among the smartest people around him, called the Solarium exercise in which he had those who wanted to roll back the Soviets, those who were in favor of massive retaliation and then a doctrine form of containment and over a 5-week period three teams competed. It was highly classified and they looked at the long term, systematic long term, economic and strategic consequences for the United States and then they testified. Eisenhower sat and chaired this session in which this was done and it was a way in which Eisenhower sort of inculcated John Foster Dulles and the sort of Republican wing at that time who hated George Kennan to embrace the doctrine of containment which they had opposed when they came in. We need the Mykleby Porter paper, the Mr. Y paper competing with four other, five other papers. Bob Kagan should head up a group, there should be a group but you should get by end from the administration for a serious strategic debate which this country hasn't had about these issues. We flail around but there's not a serious strategic debate.

<Slaughter> I just want--I mean I agree obviously people do try to change. President Obama was elected on change but to go back to the 9/11 we changed fundamentally after 9/11. If you look at the spending, if you look at the focus before 9/11 we were talking about China as the next peer competitor. We were--the defense spending was going down and then there was an enormous change because there was a crisis. We had a similar crisis in 2008. We have not used it. That's exactly what I think Steve was saying for change at that deeper level. I agree that there really needs to be a much bigger shift in terms of how we talk about energy, how we talk about infrastructure, how we talk about education. That has happened in the past and isn't happening now. So, I do think it's

possible to have that deeper debate but I don't think we've actually been able to do it either in the public at large, our politicians--we can point fingers but what's interesting to me about this paper is it really says we need to go a layer deeper and have this discussion at that level and make some much bigger shifts at our assumptions about where our power comes from.

<Friedman> Please.

<Audience> Thank you and I'll be very brief.

<Friedman> And who are you sir.

<Audience> I'm Robert Steele, I publish Phi Beta Iota, the Public Intelligence Blog. And in 1992 I want you to know that the United States Marine Corps told the Secretary of Defense that we should focus on the most likely rather than the worse case probabilities. I was the second ranking civilian in Marine Corps Intelligence then and we could not get anyone to either change the nits or to do open source intelligence. Now, I'll give you three words and these are the only three words you need I think to do what should have been done first which is the homework: strategic, analytic, model. If you look those three words up on Google you will get to everything that you need. My life was changed by Dr. Brent Scowcroft in the secure world study which for the first time in history listed and prioritized the 10 top level threats to humanity which the U.S. government persists in ignoring. What my earth intelligence network has gone on to do is define the 12 core policies from agriculture to water in the eight demographics and this is my last sentence. Nothing we do in the United States matters unless we create a strategic analytic model that will allow Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Russia, Venezuela and wildcards like the Congo to achieve non-zero. And if you have another follow up here the rest of us got this message at 6 this morning. I hope there are 10,000 people watching because we, Harrison, Owen and I blogged it, this is phenomenal it's the first time Washington is actually paying attention to what the rest of us have been saying. So, if you have another session asks Harris and Owen to lead it and make it an open space session all day.

<Friedman> Okay.

>> Thank you.

>> Well, let's get some more--let's just get some more voices up there if we could. Thank you very much, please.

[Inaudible Remark]

>> Yeah right here and then we'll go.

<Audience> I'm Susan Hutchison. I'm on the board of the Woodrow Wilson Center and I'd like to talk about communication or ask you about communication. All five of you are excellent communicators, written and spoken. When we talk about all-new media and this

amazing ability to mobilize people I can't help but think about what's going on in the Middle East and, you know, democracy breaking out all over as we like to think of in Egypt for example. But this overriding fear that when push comes to shove this is not gonna result in a better situation for us or the world when free elections are held in Egypt for example because whoever best manages the communication is going to win the election. And so as you look at the Muslim brotherhood for example, most people think they've got the power right now if there were an election tomorrow, they would win. That's not we think in our best interest, or the world's. So, could you address this whole idea of the medium is not the message. The message is the message. The medium is used to communicate and it's a little scary.

<Friedman> Let me try to pick that up, yeah, because I think there is actually a third option which, you know, whenever I get to speak on college campuses about the energy issue. Because I'm a big believer that at the end of the day bang-bang beats tweet-tweet and we should always keep that in mind. You know, that a lot of these Twitter or Facebooks I'm into all of these, you know, but I also understand its real limits. And one of the messages I always try to convey to college students is that Exxon Mobil, they're not on Facebook, they're just in your face. [Laughter] Peabody Coal, they don't have a chatroom. They're in the cloakroom of the US Congress with bags of money. So if you want to change the world, you gotta get out of Facebook and into somebody's face whether that's in the US Congress or Tahrir Square and there's just this little problem I really know of – you'll say why I blogged on it. I blogged on it, really. That's like firing a mortar into the Milky Way Galaxy, okay. [Laughter] I'm really glad you blogged on it, you know, because you know, I really have to tell you, you know, that I'm totally into blogs and I love Steve. I mean it's not bad.

[Inaudible Remarks]

[Laughter]

<Friedman> But, you know, we have to and young people in particular, there is a faux sense of activism out there that is really dangerous. Because I always try to say, you know, trust me on this, I'm an old fart now. The world--your world may be digital but politics is still analog and we've kind of gotten away from that. Egypt changed. Yes Facebook was hugely important in organizing people but the fundamental change happened because a million people showed up in Tahrir Square. Civil rights changed in this country 'cause a million people showed up on the mall. Women's rights changed in this country because a million women, you know, showed up on the mall. And the reason there is no change in energy policy in this country is because we have nobody showing up anywhere. And so, this--you really can get caught up; I think you have to think seriously where Twitter starts. It's very important for Facebook and how it, you know, is used. And so the Muslim Brotherhood isn't gonna win because they have a better message on Facebook. They're gonna win because they've organized the neighborhood. They have precinct captains. They've got boots on the ground who will go out to vote. And there's a little bit you can really fall into. I got so many followers on Twitter. I got so

many hits on my column and you think you're changing the world and it's a complete illusion.

<Kagan> Can I just jump in 'cause each of these are such interesting examples we get but I don't want to dominate this new-old thing. But there had been revolutions in the world without Twitter and Facebook. The French Revolution I'm pretty sure did not have Twitter, Facebook, the Internet. They had a revolution. People had been on the streets over and over again. They--the new technologies may facilitate it. They may--they may change the nature of it but people have been engaged in revolutions. And to me, what the most important lesson of Egypt is that the--what I consider to be the indomitable human desire for freedom, for individual autonomy, for justice is still unfolding. We've seen this in every other part of the world and the last holdout was the Arab world. So to me, this is just the unfolding process which you might say has been unfolding for 3 or 400 years now which the United States had a big role both within beginning and then in supporting. So, you know, I don't know what the lesson of that is and [simultaneous talking].

<Scowcroft> I think there's one difference. Egypt absolutely and nothing unique about it but the fact that one guy emulating himself in Tunisia sparked the whole region even to the Chinese being very concerned. That's new.

<Friedman> Yeah.

<Kagan> Because of communications?

<Friedman> [Simultaneous Talking] I think Facebook, Twitter they are hugely important but I agree with you that underneath it was something actually universal, deep and very human. And we tend to--we gotta keep this in balance.

<Kagan> Which remains a big strength of the United States.

<Friedman> Yeah.

<Kagan> By the way.

<Clemons> But on the Muslim Brotherhood, I wanna just present it on the table that in this paper there is a comment and they're saying, we need to avoid bin-ism or creating these clusters that throw everyone in. I think that we need to have an honest discussion about the Muslim Brotherhood. In fact, it would be very smart of Jane Harman and others to organize a conference to invite folks here [laughter] and to engage because the Muslim Brotherhood in a totalitarian regime is the only action in town. I've met many Muslim Brotherhood members across the Arab region. Some of them are real democrats. Some of them do have theories of how do you respect minority political rights within a different regime. Some of them are awful and I think one of the challenges when you remain walled off from the whole system is you actually end up giving an odd kind of legitimacy. One of the challenges for the United States today as it goes out and tries to help people, it actually can actually delegitimize them in the eyes of certain interest and

legitimate the alternative. We need to figure out an engagement strategy for political Islam writ large but get out of throwing everyone in the Muslim Brotherhood or in the-- from Islamic care. We gotta get engaged and begin to figure out so they can see who will engage with and who are the awful thugs who don't believe in women's rights, or don't believe in any kind of minority, political rights. That's the challenge. And so, I welcome the space in Egypt that won't be just two alternatives. There will be 17 alternatives that come up--

<Friedman> That's a good point.

<Slaughter> Just before Bob leaves, I just have to say, it's just like no one is for dumb wars. There's actually nobody out there who is saying Twitter or Facebook caused this. What caused this was the desire for justice and the tremendous bravery of people who are willing to go out even though they risk getting shot. It's an enabling force and it is an enabling force as Brent said that is actually quite extraordinary particularly in combating the technology of oppression. This is the technology of liberation. It's against the technology of repression. But it does also and I wanna go back to this, it allows individuals to think that they actually can be part of something bigger if they are mobilized to actually live. And that goes back again to what's really changed here, that individuals have a role they didn't have before. And I go back to the point that this paper makes which is we've gotta be investing in those individuals in this country. We've gotta be thinking about our social, our intellectual, and our physical infrastructure as a source of our power 'cause I don't wanna end without actually just thanking Wayne Porter, Colonel Wayne Porter--Captain Wayne Porter and Colonel Puck Mykleby for actually opening this conversation.

[Applause]

<Friedman> We'll close it on that. Thanks to the panel. This was great. Jane, thank you for hosting us and we look forward to further discussion. Thank you so much.

>> Thank you.

>> Thanks to the panel. It's great to see everyone.